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Abstract. We implemented Simon’s quantum period finding circuit for
functions Fn2 → Fn2 with period s ∈ Fn2 up to n = 7 on the 14-qubit
quantum device IBM Q 16 Melbourne. Our experiments show that with
a certain probability τ(n) we measure erroneous vectors that are not
orthogonal to s. While Simon’s algorithm for extracting s runs in poly-
nomial time in the error-free case τ(n) = 0, we show that the problem
of extracting s ∈ Fn2 in the general setting 0 ≤ τ(n) ≤ 12 is as hard as
solving LPN (Learning Parity with Noise) with parameters n and τ(n).
Hence, in the error-prone case we may not hope to find periods in time
polynomial in n. However, we also demonstrate theoretically and exper-
imentally that erroneous quantum measurements are still useful to find
periods faster than with purely classical algorithms, even for large errors
τ(n) close to 1
2
.
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1 Introduction
The discovery of Shor’s quantum algorithm [18] for factoring and computing
discrete logarithms in 1994 had a dramatic impact on public-key cryptogra-
phy, initiating the fast growing field of post-quantum cryptography that studies
problems supposed to be hard even on quantum computers, such as e.g. Learning
Parity with Noise (LPN) [3] and Learning with Errors (LWE) [16].
For some decades, the common belief was that the impact of quantum al-
gorithms on symmetric crypto is way less dramatic, since the effect of Grover
search can be easily handled by doubling the key size. However, starting with
the initial work of Kuwakado, Morii [14] and followed by Kaplan, Leurent, Lev-
errier and Naya-Plasencia [13] it was shown that (among others) the well-known
Even-Mansour construction can be broken with quantum CPA-attacks [5] in
polynomial time using Simon’s quantum period finding algorithm [19]. This is
especially interesting, because Even and Mansour [11] proved that in the ideal
cipher model any classical attack on their construction with n-bit keys requires
Ω(2
n
2 ) steps.
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These results triggered a whole line of work that studies the impact of Si-
mon’s algorithm and its variants for symmetric key cryptography, including
e.g. [17,15,2,6,12,8,7]. In a nutshell, Simon’s quantum circuit produces for a peri-
odic function f : Fn2 → Fn2 with period s ∈ Fn2 , i.e. f(x) = f(z) iff z ∈ {x,x+ s},
via quantum measurements uniformly distributed vectors y that are orthogonal
to s. It is not hard to see that from a basis of y’s that spans the subspace orthog-
onal to s, the period s can be computed via elementary linear algebra in time
polynomial in n. Thus, Simon’s algorithm finds the period with a linear number
of quantum measurements (and therefore calls to f), and some polynomial time
classical post-processing. On any purely classical computer however, finding the
period of f is equivalent to collision finding and thus requires Ω(2
n
2 ) operations.
Our contributions. We implemented Simon’s algorithm on IBM’s freely available
Q 16 Melbourne [1], called IBM-Q16 in the following, that realizes 14-qubit
quantum circuits. Since Simon’s quantum circuit requires for n-bit periodic func-
tions 2n qubits, we were able to implement functions up to n = 7 bits. Due to
its limited size, IBM-Q16 is not capable of performing any error correction [9]
on the circuits.
Implementation. Our experiments show that with some (significant) error
probability τ , we measure on IBM-Q16 vectors y that are not orthogonal to
s. The error probability τ depends on many factors, such as the number of 1-
and 2-qubit gates that we use to realize Simon’s circuit, IBM-Q16’s topology
that allows only limited 2-qubit applications, and even the individual qubits
that we use. We optimize our Simon implementation to achieve minimal error
τ . Since increasing n requires an increasing amount of gates, we discovered ex-
perimentally that τ(n) increases as a function of n. For the function f that we
implemented, we found τ -values ranging between τ(2) = 0.1 and τ(7) = 0.15.
Although IBM-Q16 produces faults for Simon’s quantum circuit, we still ob-
serve qualitatively the desired quantum effect: Vectors y orthogonal to s appear
with significant larger probabilities than vectors not orthogonal to s. Moreover,
experimentally our distribution among those vectors that are orthogonal (respec-
tively not orthogonal) to s is close to uniform. Notice that intuitively it should
be hard to distinguish orthogonal vectors from not orthogonal ones.
Hardness. Based on our IBM-Q16 experiments, we obtain a (simplified) error
model that any quantum measurement yields with probability 1− τ a uniformly
chosen vector y orthogonal to s, and with probability τ a uniformly chosen vector
y not orthogonal to s. We call Learning Simon with Noise (LSN) the problem of
recovering s ∈ Fn2 from quantum measurements. We show that solving LSN with
parameters n, τ is polynomial time equivalent to solving the famous Learning
Parity with Noise (LPN) problem with the same parameters n, τ . The core of
the reduction shows that LSN samples coming from quantum measurements of
Simon’s circuit can be turned into perfectly distributed LPN samples, and vice
versa.
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Hence, quantum measurements of Simon’s circuit realize a physical LPN or-
acle. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known physical realization of
such an oracle. Moreover, from our hardness result we obtain a quite surprising
link between symmetric and public key cryptography: Handling errors (i.e. not
orthogonal vectors) in Simon’s algorithm, the most important quantum algo-
rithm in symmetric crypto, is as hard as LPN, one of the major problems in
post-quantum public key crypto.
From a cryptanalyst’s perspective, this result may at first sound quite nega-
tive, since we believe that we cannot solve LPN (and thus by the LPN-to-LSN
reduction also LSN) in time polynomial in (n, τ) — not even on a quantum com-
puter. On the positive side, the LSN-to-LPN reduction accurately tells us how
harmful errors τ from quantum computers are in practice, and how they affect
the time complexity for quantum-assisted period finding.
Error Handling. We may use the LSN-to-LPN reduction to handle errors from
IBM-Q16 via LPN-solving algorithms. In theory, the best algorithm for solving
LPN with constant τ is the BKW-algorithm of Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [4]
with time complexity 2
O
(
n
log(n
τ
)
)
. This already improves on the classical time 2
n
2
for period finding. However, the BKW-algorithm has a huge sample and memory
complexity, which hinder its practical implementation.
At the moment, the largest LPN instances with errors in IBM-Q16’s range
τ ∈ [0.1, 0.15] are solved with variants of the low-memory algorithms Pooled
Gauss and Well-Pooled Gauss of Esser, Ku¨bler, May [10]. We show that
Pooled Gauss solves LSN for τ ≤ 0.292 faster than classical period finding
algorithms. Well-Pooled Gauss even improves on any classical period finding
algorithm for all errors τ < 12 .
Well-Pooled Gauss is able to handle errors in time 2cn, where c < 12
is constant for constant τ . For τ = 0, we obtain polynomial time as predicted
by Simon’s analysis. However, for 0 < τ < 12 we achieve exponential run time,
but still improve over the purely classical computation. This indicates that we
achieve quantum supremacy for the period finding problem on sufficiently large
computers, even in the presence of errors: Our quantum oracle helps us in speed-
ing up computation! But as opposed to the exponential speedup from the (overly
optimistic) error-free Simon setting τ = 0, we obtain in the (realistic) general
error-prone Simon setting 0 < τ < 12 only a polynomial speedup with a polyno-
mial of degree 12c > 1.
Concerning quantum supremacy, assume that one could build a quantum
device with 486 qubits performing Simon’s circuit on a 243-bit periodic function
with error τ = 18 . Then the error handling would translate into an LPN-instance
with (n, τ) = (243, 18 ). Such an LPN instance was solved in [10] on 64 threads
in only 15 days, whereas classically we would need 2121 steps for period finding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall Simon’s original
quantum circuit, and already introduce our error model that we experimentally
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verify in Section 3 on IBM-Q16. In Section 4 we show the polynomial time
equivalence of LSN and LPN. In Section 5 we theoretically show that quantum
measurements with error τ in combination with LPN-solvers outperform classical
period finding for any τ < 12 . Eventually, in Section 6 we experimentally extract
periods out of erroneous IBM-Q16 measurements.
2 Simon’s Algorithm in the Presence of Errors
Notation. All logs in this paper are base 2. Let x ∈ Fn2 denote a binary vector
with coordinates x = (xn−1, . . . , x0). Let 0 ∈ Fn2 be the vector with all-zero
coordinates. We denote by U the uniform distribution over F2, and by Un the
uniform distribution over Fn2 . If a random variable X is chosen from distribution
U , we write X ∼ U . We denote by Berτ the Bernoulli distribution for F2, i.e. a
0, 1-valued X ∼ Berτ satisfies P[X = 1] = τ .
Two vectors x,y are orthogonal if their inner product 〈x,y〉 := ∑n−1i=0 xiyi mod
2 is 0, otherwise they are called not orthogonal. Let s ∈ Fn2 . Then we denote the
subspace of all vectors orthogonal to s as
s⊥ = {x ∈ Fn2 | 〈x, s〉 = 0} .
Let Y = {y1, . . . ,yk} ⊆ Fn2 . Then we define Y ⊥ = {x | 〈x,yi〉 = 0 for all i}.
For a Boolean function f : Fn2 → Fn2 we denote its universal (quantum)
embedding by
Uf : F2n2 → F2n2 with (x,y) 7→ (x, f(x) + y).
Notice that Uf (Uf (x,y)) = (x,y).
Let |x〉 ∈ C2 with x ∈ F2 be a qubit. We denote by H the Hadamard function
x 7→ 1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)x |1〉).
We briefly write Hn for the n-fold tensor product H⊗. . .⊗H. Let |x〉 |y〉 ∈ C4 be
a 2-qubit system. The cnot (controlled not) function is the universal embedding
of the identity function, i.e. |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |x+ y〉. We call the first qubit |x〉 control
bit, since we perform a not on |y〉 iff x = 1.
A Simon function is a periodic (2 : 1)-Boolean function defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Simon function/problem). Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 . We call f a
Simon function if there exists some period s ∈ Fn2 \{0} such that for all x,y ∈ Fn2
we have
f(x) = f(y)⇔ y = x + s.
In Simon’s problem we have to find s given oracle access to f .
In order to solve Simon’s problem classically, we have to find some collision
x 6= y satisfying f(x) = f(y). It is well-known that this requires Ω(2n2 ) function
evaluations.
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Simon’s quantum algorithm [19], called Simon (see Algorithm 1), solves Si-
mon’s problem with only O(n) function evaluations on a quantum circuit. It is
known that on input |0n〉⊗ |0n〉 a measurement of the first n qubits of the quan-
tum circuit QSimonf depicted in Figure 1 yields some y ∈ Fn2 that is orthogonal to
s. Moreover, y ∈ Fn2 is uniformly distributed in the subspace s⊥, t.i. we obtain
each y ∈ s⊥ with probability 12n−1 . Simon repeats to measure QSimonf until it
has collected n− 1 linearly independent vectors y1, . . . ,yn−1, from which s can
be computed via linear algebra in polynomial time. It is not hard to see that
a collection of n − 1 linearly independent vectors requires only O(n) function
evaluations.
|0n〉 Hn
Uf
Hn
|0n〉
Fig. 1: Quantum circuit QSimonf
Algorithm 1: Simon
Input : Simon function fs : Fn2 → Fn2 .
Output: Period s ∈ Fn2
1 Set Y = ∅.
2 repeat
3 Run QSimonfs on |0n〉 ⊗ |0n〉.
4 Let y ∈ Fn2 be the measurement of the first n qubits.
5 If y /∈ span(Y ), then include y in Y .
6 until |Y | = n− 1
7 Compute the unique s ∈ Y ⊥ \ {0}.
8 return s.
At this point we should stress that Simon only works for error-free quantum
computations. Hence we have to ensure that each y is indeed in s⊥. Assume that
we obtain in line 4 of algorithm Simon at least a single y with 〈y, s〉 = 1. Then
the output of Simon is always false! Thus, Simon is not robust with respect to
computational errors on the quantum device.
More precisely, if we obtain in line 4 erroneous y /∈ s⊥ with probability τ ,
0 < τ ≤ 12 , then Simon outputs the correct s only with exponentially small
probability (1− τ)n. This motivates our following quite simple error model.
Definition 2.2 (Error Model). Let τ ∈ R with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 12 . Upon measuring
the first n qubits of QSimonf , our quantum device outputs with probability 1 − τ
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some uniformly random y ∈ s⊥, and with probability τ some uniformly random
y ∈ Fn2 \ s⊥. That is, the output distribution is
P[QSimonf outputs y] =
{
1−τ
2n−1 if y ∈ s⊥
τ
2n−1 else
.
We call τ the error rate of our quantum device.
In the subsequent Section 3 we show that the IBM-Q16 realization of quan-
tum circuits approximately follows our error model of Definition 2.2.
Notice that intuitively there is no efficient way to tell whether y ∈ s⊥. This
intuition is stated more precisely in Section 4, where we show that computing s
from the distribution in Definition 2.2 is as hard as solving the Learning Parity
with Noise (LPN) problem.
3 Quantum Period Finding on IBM-Q16
We ran our experiments on the IBM-Q16 Melbourne, which (despite its name)
realizes 14-qubit circuits. Let us number IBM-Q16’s qubits as 0, . . . , 13. Our
implementation goal was to realize quantum period finding for Simon functions
fs : Fn2 → Fn2 with error rate as small as possible. To this end we used the
following optimization criteria.
Gate count. IBM-Q16 realizes several 1-qubit gates such as Hadamard and
rotations, but only the 2-qubit gate cnot. On IBM-Q16, the application of
any gates introduces some error, where especially the 2-qubit cnot introduces
approximately as much error as ten 1-qubit gates (see Appendix A, Table 3).
Therefore, we introduce a circuit norm that defines a weighted gate count, which
we minimize in the following.
Definition 3.1. Let Q be a quantum circuit with g1 many 1-qubit gates and g2
many 2-qubit gates. Then we define Q’s circuit-norm as CN(Q) := g1 + 10g2.
Topology. IBM-Q16 can only process 2-qubit gates on qubits that are adjacent
in its topology graph, see Figure 2. Let G = (V,E) be the directed topology
graph, where node i denotes qubit i. Moreover, let G¯ = (V, E¯) be the undirected
version of G, i.e. we have {u, v} ∈ E¯ iff (u, v) ∈ E or (v, u) ∈ E.
If (u, v) ∈ E then we can directly implement cnot(u, v), where u serves as
the control bit. If we wish to implement cnot(v, u) instead, we may use the
identity of Figure 3 at the cost of an additional 4 Hadamard gates. Hence, we
call qubits u, v adjacent iff {u, v} ∈ E¯.
Let us assume that we want to realize cnot(1, 3) in our algorithm. Since
{1, 3} /∈ E¯ we cannot directly realize this operation. But we may first swap the
contents of qubits 2 and 3 by realizing a swap gate via 3 cnots as depicted in
Figure 4. Since (2, 3) ∈ E, we realize the first and third cnot directly, whereas
the second cnot is realized as in Figure 3. Thus, with a total of 3 cnot and 4
Hadamards we swap the content of qubit 3 into 2. Since (1, 2) ∈ E, we may now
apply cnot(1, 2).
6
Fig. 2: Topology graph G(V,E) of IBM-Q16.
H • H
=
H H •
Fig. 3: Control bit change
Function choice. Let s ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, and let i ∈ [0, n− 1] with si = 1. We define
fs : Fn2 → Fn2 , x 7→ x + xi · s.
Let us first show that fs is indeed a Simon function as given in Definition 2.1.
We have for all x ∈ Fn2 that
fs(x + s) = x + s + (x + s)i · s = x + s + (xi + 1) · s = x + xi · s = fs(x).
Thus, f has period s. It remains to show that fs is (2 : 1), i.e. that fs(x) = fs(y)
implies that y = x or y = x + s. From fs(x) = fs(y) we conclude
x + xi · s = y + yi · s.
In the case xi = yi this implies x = y, whereas in the case xi 6= yi this implies
y = x + s.
×
=
• •
=
• H • H •
× • H H
Fig. 4: Realisation of swap via 3 cnots and 4 Hadamards.
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Instantiation and Discussion of Function Choice. Throughout the paper, we
instantiate our function fs with the period s = (sn−1, . . . , s0) = 0n−211 and
xi = x0. We may realize fs with n cnot-gates for copying x, and an additional
2 cnot-gates for the controlled addition of s via control bit 0. See Figure 5 for
an implementation of fs with n = 3.
0 : x0 H • • • H
1 : x1 H • H
2 : x2 H • H
3 : y0
4 : y1
5 : y2
Fig. 5: Simon circuit Q1 with our realization of fs and CN(Q1) = 56. The first
3 cnots copy x, the remaining two cnots add s = 110.
Our function choice has the advantage that it can be implemented with
only n + 2 cnot gates (if we are able to avoid swaps) and 2n Hadamards.
Thus we obtain a small circuit norm CN = 10(n + 2) + 2n, which in turn
implies a relatively small error on IBM-Q16. We perform further circuit norm
minimization in Section 3.1.
We would like to point out that as a downside of its simplicity, for our class of
functions fs it is classically not hard to find the period s. Since f(1
n) + 1n = s,
a single classical f -query directly reveals s. However, we want to stress that
our quantum algorithm does not exploit this property of f in any manner, but
instead works for any Simon function. The only reason that we use our simple
form f is that IBM-Q16 forces us to have a low circuit norm for producing a
tolerable error.
3.1 Minimizing the gate count of fs
We may implement fs on IBM-Q16 directly as the circuit Q1 from Figure 5.
Since Q1 uses 6 Hadamard- and 5 cnot-gates, we have circuit norm CN(Q1) =
56, but only when ignoring IBM-Q16’s topology. As already discussed, IBM-
Q16 only allows cnots between adjacent qubits in the topology graphG = (V,E)
of Figure 2.
Thus, IBM-Q16 compiles Q1 to Q2 as depicted in Figure 6. Let us check that
Q2 realizes the same circuit as Q1, but only acts on adjacent qubits. Let Ufs :
F62 → F62 be the universal quantum embedding of fs with (x,y) 7→ (x, f(x)+y) =
8
x + x0s + y). In Ufs we first add each xi to yi via cnots, see Figure 5. Thus, we
have to make sure that each xi is adjacent to its yi. Second, we add s = 011 via
cnots controlled by x0. Thus, we have to ensure that x0 is adjacent to y0 and
y1.
We denote by i : j that qubit i contains the value j. This allows us to define
the starting configuration as
0 : x0 1 : x1 2 : x2 3 : y0 4 : y1 5 : y2.
Step 1 of Q2 (see Figure 5) performs swap(2, 3) and thus results in configuration
0 : x0 1 : x1 2 : y0 3 : x2 4 : y1 5 : y2.
Step 2 of C2 performs swap(1, 2) as well as swap(4, 3). This results in configu-
ration
0 : x0 1 : y0 2 : x1 3 : y1 4 : x2 5 : y2.
Eventually, Step 3 of C2 performs swap(0, 1) and swap(2, 3) resulting in
0 : y0 1 : x0 2 : y1 3 : x1 4 : x2 5 : y2.
Since (1, 0), (2, 3), (5, 4) ∈ E, in Step 4 we now compute cnot(1, 0), cnot(3, 2)
and cnot(4, 5) by changing for the second and third operation the control bit (see
Figure 3). This realizes the computation of x+y. For realizing the addition of xi ·
s = x0 ·011, in Step 5 we compute cnot(1, 0) and cnot(1, 2) using (1, 0), (1, 2) ∈
E.
0 : x0 H H H
1 : x1 H • H • H • • H • H • • • • H
2 : x2 H • H • H • H H • H • H • H • H
3 : y0 H H H H H H H H H
4 : y1 • H • H • H H H
5 : y2 H • H
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Fig. 6: IBM-Q16 compiles Q1 to Q2 with CN(Q2) = 234.
In totalQ2 consumes 34 1-bit gates and 20 2-bit gates and thus hasCN(Q2) =
234, as compared to CN(Q1) = 56. In the following, our goal is the construction
of a quantum circuit that implements Q1’s functionality with minimal circuit
norm on IBM-Q16.
In Figure 7 we start with circuit Q3, for which our optimization eventually results
in circuit Q4 (Figure 9) that can be realized on IBM-Q16 with gate count only
CN(Q4) = 33.
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0 : x1 H • H
1 : y1
2 : x0 H • • • H
3 : y0
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
Fig. 7: Circuit Q3.
From the discussion before, it should not be hard to see that Q3 realizes
QSimonfs , but yet it has to be optimized for IBM-Q16. First of all observe that
cnot is self-inverse, and thus we can eliminate the two cnot(2, 3) gates. After-
wards, we can safely remove qubit 3. The resulting situation for qubits 0, 1, 2 is
depicted in Figure 8.
H • H
= H • H H • H = H • • H
H • H
Fig. 8: Optimization of Q3.
From Figure 8 we see that the change of control bits from cnot(0, 1), cnot(2, 1)
to cnot(1, 0), cnot(1, 2) leads to some cancellation of self-inverse Hadamard
gates. Moreover, the second Hadamard of qubit 1 can be eliminated, since it
does not influence the measurement. We end up with circuit Q4 with an opti-
mized gate count of CN(Q4) = 33.
Since (1, 0), (1, 2), (6, 8) ∈ E, all three cnots of Q4 can directly by realized
on IBM-Q16.
Notice that a configuration with optimal circuit norm is in general not unique.
For our example, the following configuration yields the same circuit norm as the
configuration of Q4:
3 : y0 4 : x0 5 : y1 6 : x1 8 : y2 9 : x2.
We optimized our IBM-Q16 implementation by choosing among all configu-
rations with minimal circuit norm the one using IBM-Q16’s qubits of smallest
10
0 : x1
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x0
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
Fig. 9: Optimized circuit Q4 on IBM-Q16 with CN(Q4) = 33.
error rate (see Figure 2). The choice of our configurations is given in Table 1, a
complete list of optimized circuits can be found in Appendix A, Figure 11.
@
@n
q
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 CN
2 x0 y1 x1 y0 21
3 x0 y1 x1 x2 y0 y2 33
4 x0 y1 x1 x2 y0 y2 x3 y3 45
5 x0 y1 x1 y4 x2 y0 y2 x3 y3 x4 57
6 x0 y1 x1 y4 y5 x5 x2 y0 y2 x3 y3 x4 69
7 x0 y1 x1 y4 x5 x5 x2 y0 y2 x3 y3 x4 y7 x7 81
Table 1: Table of configurations.
3.2 Experiments on IBM Q 16
For each dimension n = 2, . . . , 7 we took 8192 measurements on IBM-Q16 of
our optimized circuits from the previous section. The resulting relative frequen-
cies are depicted in Figure 10. For each n, let S(n) denote the set of erroneous
measurements in Fn2 \ s⊥. Then we compute the error rate τ(n) as τ(n) = |S(n)|8192 .
In Figure 10 we draw horizontal lines 1−τ(n)2n−1 , respectively
τ(n)
2n−1 , for the probabil-
ity distributions of our error model for orthogonal, respectively not orthogonal,
vectors.
We observe the following:
– Vectors in s⊥ are more frequent. We see that in principle IBM-Q16
works well for period finding. E.g. for n = 3, we have {s}⊥ = {011}⊥ =
{000, 011, 100, 111}, and we measure one of these vectors with probability
1−τ ≈ 90%. But this in turn implies that we also measure erroneous vectors
in Fn2 \ {s}⊥ with probability τ ≈ 10%.
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(d) τ(5) = 0.126
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(f) τ(7) = 0.147
Fig. 10: IBM-Q16 measurements of our optimized circuits (see Appendix A,
Figure 11).
– Triangular structure. In Figure 10 we ordered our measurements lexico-
graphically. It seems that the first vectors in lexicographic order are measured
with a larger probability than the last vectors. This is not overly surprising,
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since we also ordered our qubits by quality – starting with lowest error rate
for the least significant bit x0 up to highest error rate for the most significant
bit xn−1 (nevertheless e.g. for n = 3 it seems that the qubit for x2 performed
worse than the one for x3). We can mitigate the effect of different qubit qual-
ity by permuting the qubits in our starting configuration such that we retain
the same circuit norm. However, we deliberately ordered the qubits in de-
scending quality to make the quality effect visible. The triangular structure
would vanish for qubits of similar quality.
– Increasing τ(n). The error rate τ(n) is a function increasing in n. This is
what we expected, since the circuit norm increases with n and for larger n
we also had to include lower quality qubits.
– Hamming weight. Usually, measurements with small Hamming weight
appear with larger frequencies than large Hamming weight measurements.
This is a physical effect that is mainly due to the readout error of the mea-
surements in IBM-Q16 (see Appendix A, Table 3) and its significant bias
towards 0.
All in all, our error model is an oversimplified model that for ease of exposi-
tion ignores facts like error quality of different qubits and issues with Hamming
weight. It is not surprising that a single parameter like the error rate τ cannot
all too precisely capture complex physical effects and complex probability dis-
tributions. Nevertheless, we show in Section 6 that our simple error model is
accurate enough to predict the run times for extracting the secret vector s from
quantum measures with error rate τ .
4 LSN is Polynomial Time Equivalent to LSN
In the previous section, we checked experimentally on IBM-Q16 our error model
(Definition 2.2). Recall that our model states that with probability τ we measure
in the quantum circuit QSimonfs some uniformly distributed y ∈ Fn2 \ s⊥. The
question is now whether such erroneous y can easily be handled.
In this section, we answer this question in the negative. Namely, we show
that handling these errors is as hard as the well-studied LPN, which is supposed
to be hard even on quantum computers.
Definition 4.1 (LPN-Problem). Let s ∈ Fn2 \ {0} be chosen uniformly at
random, and let τ ∈ [0, 12 ). In the Learning Parity with Noise problem, de-
noted LPNn,τ , one obtains access to an oracle OLPN(s) that provides samples
(a, 〈a, s〉+ ), where a ∼ Un and  ∼ Berτ . The goal is to compute s.
Definition 4.1 explicitly excludes s = 0 in LPN. Notice that the case s = 0
implies that the LPN oracle has distribution Un × Berτ . However, in the case
s 6= 0, we have Pa[〈a, s〉 = 0] = 12 , which implies Pa[〈a, s〉+ = 0] = 12 . Therefore
the LPN samples for s 6= 0 have distribution Un × U . This allows us to easily
distinguish both cases by a majority test, whenever τ is polynomially bounded
away from 12 . Hence, s = 0 is not a hard case for LPN and may wlog excluded.
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Let us now define the related Learning Simon with Noise problem that reflects
our error model.
Definition 4.2 (LSN-Problem). Let s ∈ Fn2 \ {0} be chosen uniformly at
random, and let τ ∈ [0, 12 ). In the Learning Simon with Noise problem, denoted
LSNn,τ , one obtains access to an oracle OLSN(s) that provides samples y, where
y ∈ Fn2 is distributed as in Definition 2.2, i.e.
P[y] =
{
1−τ
2n−1 , if y ∈ s⊥
τ
2n−1 , else
and therefore P[〈y, s〉 = 0] = 1− τ.
The goal is to compute s.
In the following we prove that LSNn,τ is polynomial time equivalent to
LPNn,τ by showing that we can perfectly mutually simulateOLPN(s) andOLSN(s).
The purpose of excluding s 6= 0 from LPNn,τ is to guarantee in the reduction
non-trivial periods s 6= 0 in LSNn,τ .
Theorem 4.1 (Equivalence of LPN and LSN). Let A be an algorithm that
solves LPNn,τ (respectively LSNn,τ ) using m oracle queries in time T with suc-
cess probability A. Then there exists an algorithm B that solves LSNn,τ (re-
spectively LPNn,τ ) using m oracle queries in time T with success probability
B ≥ A2 .
Proof. Assume that we want to solve LSN via an algorithm ALPN with success
probability A as in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: LPN ⇒ LSN
Input : n, τ,OLSN(s),m
Output: s
1 Choose z ∼ Un.
2 for i = 1 to m do
3 Set yi ← OLSN(s).
4 Choose bi ∼ U .
5 end
6 s← ALPN(n, τ, (y1 + b1z, b1), . . . , (ym + bmz, bm))
We show in the following that Algorithm 2 perfectly simulates the oracle
OLPN(s) via OLSN(s) if the vector z ∼ Un chosen in Line 1 satisfies 〈z, s〉 = 1.
Since s 6= 0, we have Pz[〈z, s〉 = 1] = 12 . Therefore Algorithm 2 succeeds with
probability
B ≥ Pz[〈z, s〉 = 1 ∩ A outputs s] = A
2
.
Let us now show correctness of Algorithm 2. We first show that the con-
structed LPN samples (y + bz, b) have the correct distribution. Let  = 〈y +
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bz, s〉+ b. Since 〈z, s〉 = 1, we have
Py[ = 1] = Py[〈y+bz, s〉+b = 1] = Py[〈y, s〉+b〈z, s〉+b = 1] = Py[〈y, s〉 = 1] = τ.
It remains to show that y + bz is uniformly distributed. To this end, we show
that
p0 = Py,b[y + bz | 〈y, s〉 = 0] = 1
2n
.
Analogous, it follows that p1 = Py,b[y + bz | 〈y, s〉 = 1] = 12n . From both
statements we obtain
Py,b[y + bz] = Py[〈y, s〉 = 0] · p0 + Py[〈y, s〉 = 1] · p1 = 1− τ
2n
+
τ
2n
=
1
2n
,
as desired. It remains to show that
p0 = Py,b[y + bz | 〈y, s〉 = 0]
= Pb[b = 0] · Py[y | 〈y, s〉 = 0] + Pb[b = 1] · Pa[y + z | 〈y, s〉 = 0]
=
1
2
(
1− τ
2n−1
+
τ
2n−1
)
=
1
2n
.
This completes the analysis of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3: LSN ⇒ LPN
Input : n, τ,OLPN(s),m
Output: s
1 Choose z ∼ Un.
2 for i = 1 to m do
3 Set (ai, bi)← OLPN(s).
4 end
5 s← ALSN(n, τ,a1 + b1z, . . . ,am + bmz)
For Algorithm 3 we conclude the success probability analogous to the reason-
ing for Algorithm 2, i.e. we succeed when 〈z, s〉 = 1 and ALSN succeeds. So let
us assume in the following correctness analysis that we are in the case 〈z, s〉 = 1.
This implies for the constructed LSN samples a + bz that
〈a + bz, s〉 = 0⇔ 〈a, s〉+ b〈z, s〉 = 0⇔ 〈a, s〉 = b.
Let  = 〈a, s〉+ b. It follows that
Pa,b[〈a + bz, s〉 = 0] = Pa,b[〈a, s〉 = b] = Pa,b[ = 0] = 1− τ.
We also have to show that we obtain a uniform distribution among all a+bz ∈ s⊥.
This follows from
Pa,b[a + bz | 〈a + bz, s〉 = 0] = Pa,b[a + bz | 〈a, s〉 = b]
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= Pa[〈a, s〉 = 0] · Pa,b[a + bz | 〈a, s〉 = b = 0] +
Pa[〈a, s〉 = 1] · Pa,b[a + bz | 〈a, s〉 = b = 1]
=
1
2
· Pa[a | 〈a, s〉 = 0] + 1
2
· Pa[a + z | 〈a, s〉 = 1]
=
1
2
· 1
2n−1
+
1
2
· 1
2n−1
=
1
2n−1
.
Analogous, we can show that we obtain a uniform distribution among all
a + bz ∈ Fn2 \ s⊥. This proves that we perfectly simulate LSN-samples via OLPN,
and thus shows correctness of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 4.1 shows that under the LPN assumption we cannot expect to solve
LSN — i.e. to handle error-prone quantum measurements in Simon’s algorithm
— in polynomial time. However, it does not exclude that quantum measurements
are still useful in the sense that they help us to solve period finding faster than on
classical computers. In the following section, we show that our quantum output
indeed leads to speedups even for large error rates τ .
5 Theoretical Error Handling for Simon’s Algorithm
Recall that period finding for n-bit Simon functions classically requires time
Ω(2
n
2 ). So despite the hardness results of Section 4 we may still hope that even
error-prone quantum measurements lead to period finding speedups. Indeed, it
is well-known that for any fixed τ < 12 the BKW algorithm [4] solves LPNn,τ
— and thus by Theorem 4.1 also LSNn,τ — in time 2
O
(
n
logn
)
. This implies
that asymptotically the combination of quantum measurements together with a
suitable LPN-solver already outperforms classical period finding.
However, the BKW algorithm has sample and memory consumption 2Θ
(
n
logn
)
,
which makes it quite impractical in practice. Therefore, we want to focus on
LPN-algorithms that consume only a small amount of samples and memory. We
start with the analysis of the Pooled Gauss algorithm that was introduced at
Crypto ’17 by Esser, Ku¨bler and May [10]. Pooled Gauss solves LPNn,τ in
time Θ˜
(
2log(
1
1−τ )·n
)
using Θ˜
(
n2
)
samples and Θ˜
(
n3
)
memory.
The following theorem shows that period finding with error-prone quantum
samples in combination with Pooled Gauss is superior to purely classical pe-
riod finding whenever the error τ is bounded by τ ≤ 0.293.
Theorem 5.1. In our error model (Definition 2.2), Pooled Gauss finds the
period s ∈ Fn2 of a Simon function fs using Θ˜
(
n2
)
many LSNn,τ -samples, coming
from practical measurements of Simon’s circuit QSimonfs with error rate τ , in time
Θ˜
(
2log(
1
1−τ )·n
)
. This improves over classical period finding for error rates
τ < 1− 1√
2
≈ 0.293.
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Proof. We use Algorithm 2, where any OLPN(s)-call is provided by a measure-
ment of QSimonfs . In our error model, this gives us an LSNn,τ -instance which is
transformed by Algorithm 2 into an LPNn,τ -instance. We use Pooled Gauss
as the LPN-solver ALPN inside Algorithm 2. This immediately implies time com-
plexity Θ˜
(
2log(
1
1−τ )·n
)
.
It remains to show outperformance of the classical algorithm, i.e. log
(
1
1−τ
)
<
1
2 . Notice that our condition τ < 1− 1√2 implies that 11−τ <
√
2 and therefore
log
(
1
1− τ
)
< log(
√
2) =
1
2
.
Theorem 5.1 already shows the usefulness of a quite limited quantum oracle
that only allows us polynomially many measurements, whenever its error rate τ
is small enough.
If we allow for more quantum measurements, the Well-Pooled Gauss
algorithm of Esser, Ku¨bler and May [10] solves LPNn,τ in improved time and
query complexity Θ˜(2f(τ)n), where f(τ) = 1− 1
1+log( 11−τ )
, using Θ˜
(
n3
)
memory.
The following theorem shows that Well-Pooled Gauss in combination with
error-prone quantum measurements improves on classical period finding for any
error rate τ .
Theorem 5.2. In our error model (Definition 2.2), Well Pooled Gauss
finds the period s ∈ Fn2 of a Simon function fs using Θ˜(2f(τ)n) many LSNn,τ -
samples, coming from practical measurements of Simon’s circuit QSimonfs with
error rate τ , in time Θ˜(2f(τ)n), where
f(τ) = 1− 1
1 + log( 11−τ )
.
This improves over classical period finding for all error rates τ < 12 .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.2 we use Algorithm 2, where measurements
of QSimonfs provide the OLPN(s)-calls and Well Pooled Gauss is the LPN-
solver ALPN. Correctness and the claimed complexities follow immediately.
It remains to show outperformance of any classical period finding algorithm.
Notice that τ < 12 implies
1
1−τ < 2 and therefore log(
1
1−τ ) < 1. This in turn
implies
f(τ) = 1− 1
1 + log( 11−τ )
< 1− 1
2
=
1
2
.
The results of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 show that quantum measure-
ments of QSimonfs always help us (asymptotically) even for large error rates τ ,
provided that our error model is sufficiently accurate. In the following section,
we show that our simple error model is in practical experiments sufficiently pre-
cise to predict run times.
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6 Practical Error Handling for Simon’s Algorithm
In this section, we want to handle errors in quantum measurements of Simon’s
circuit QSimonfs in practice. By the result of Section 4 we may first transform
our quantum measurements into LPN samples, and then use one of the LPN-
algorithm from Section 5. Since the error rates from our IBM-Q16measurements
in Section 3.2 are below error rate τ ≤ 0.15, according to Theorem 5.1 for
sufficiently large n LPN-solver Pooled Gauss already outperforms classical
period finding.
The goal of this section is to check the accuracy of our error model with
respect to the prediction of run times in the presence of errors. Therefore, we do
not implement the error handling detour via reduction to LPN, but we tackle
the LSN problem directly. To this end, we simply adapt the Pooled Gauss al-
gorithm to the LSN setting. This is done in Algorithm 4, called Pooled Simon.
Algorithm 4: Pooled Simon
Input : Pool P ⊂ Fn2 of LSN samples with |P | ≥ n− 1, oracle access to fs
Output: Secret s.
1 begin
2 repeat
3 Randomly select linearly independent set Y = {y1, . . . ,yn−1} ⊂ P .
4 Compute the unique s′ ∈ Y ⊥ \ {0}
5 until fs(s
′) = fs(0)
Output: s′.
6 end
In practice, the input pool P consists of QSimonfs -measurements. It is not hard
to see that Pooled Simon succeeds iff yi ∈ s⊥ for all yi ∈ Y . Thus, Pooled
Simon works similar to the original Simon algorithm (Algorithm 1), but repeats
until it finds some error free set Y of measurements. If we would take fresh
quantum measurements in each iteration of the repeat-loop, then we succeed in
a single iteration with probability (1 − τ)n. This implies an expected run time
of ( 11−τ )
n iterations for Pooled Simon. It was shown in [10] that this analysis
also holds if we choose Y ⊆ P for sufficiently large pools P .
In order to check the accuracy of our error model, we first ran Pooled Si-
mon for every n = 2, . . . , 7 with our pools P of 213 quantum measurements from
Section 3.2. Second, we also ran Pooled Simon with pools P of 213 randomly
chosen, perfectly distributed LSN samples. As the run time cost we took the
number of fs evaluations, i.e. the number of iterations plus one for evaluating
fs(0), averaged over 1000 runs of Pooled Simon. In Table 2 we give the result-
ing run times TQM for our quantum measurements and TLSN for LSN samples.
From Table 2 we see that TLSN quite accurately predicts TQM , but that in
general it slightly underestimates TQM . This in turn implies that for Pooled
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(n, τ(n)) TQM TLSN
TQM−TLSN
n2
(2, 0.098) 1.238 1.216 5.5 · 10−3
(3, 0.099) 1.443 1.398 5.0 · 10−3
(4, 0.109) 1.727 1.644 5.2 · 10−3
(5, 0.126) 2.160 2.066 3.8 · 10−3
(6, 0.118) 2.366 2.245 3.4 · 10−3
(7, 0.147) 3.440 3.251 3.9 · 10−3
Table 2: Pooled Simon run times TQM for quantum measurements and TLSN
for LSN samples.
Simon it might be a bit harder to handle errors in quantum measurement than
solving LSN (or equivalently LPN). This seems reasonable because Pooled
Simon should profit from the LSN samples’ uniformity. However, this does not
exclude other algorithms that might be tailored to and profit from the specific
distribution of quantum measurements.
But of course, we should not over-interpret our very small run times in very
small dimension. Assume e.g. that TQM and TLSN differ only by an additive term
O(n2). Then the term TQM−TLSNn2 should be upper bounded by a constant, which
seems to hold quite well for the limited data in Table 2. In this case, our error
model would be (asymptotically) highly accurate. Only experiments on quantum
devices with more qubits can tell us more.
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A Appendix
Average measurement Range of measurements
Gate error (Hadamard) 6.28 · 10−3 (1.67 · 10−3, 14.43 · 10−3)
Gate error (cnot) 7.83 · 10−2 (3.15 · 10−2, 13.47 · 10−2)
Readout error 6.48 · 10−2 (2.58 · 10−2, 17.83 · 10−2)
T1 (µs) 50.54 (23.65, 91.36)
T2 (µs) 69.14 (25.21, 119.98)
Table 3: Calibration facts for our IBM-Q16 measurements
21
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
(a) n = 2
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
(b) n = 3
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
9 : x3 H • H
10 : y3
(c) n = 4
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
3 : y4
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
9 : x3 H • H
10 : y3
11 : x4 H • H
(d) n = 5
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
3 : y4
4 : y5
5 : x5 H • H
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
9 : x3 H • H
10 : y3
11 : x4 H • H
(e) n = 6
0 : x0
1 : y1 H • •
2 : x1
3 : y4
4 : y5
5 : x5 H • H
6 : x2 H • H
8 : y2
9 : x3 H • H
10 : y3
11 : x4 H • H
12 : y6
13 : x6 H • H
(f) n = 7
Fig. 11: Optimized circuits for n = 2, . . . , 7 with s = 0n−211. We omit qubit 7
with input y0, which is not required after optimization.
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